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The article investigates the mechanism of influence of changes in property rights distribution structure 
on a company performance. The model, taking into account the influence caused by changes in 
property rights distribution structure on the performance efficiency, has been designed. The concept 
of company institutional efficiency within the framework of the presented model has been offered. 
It reflects the ratio of profit to expenses, which occur during economic subject interaction inside a 
company through an institutional function. An index of institutional efficiency changes has been 
introduced as an evaluation criterion of influence of changes in property rights redistribution on the 
efficiency. 
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Introduction
The reforms in Russian economy have 
given a stimulus to emerging a new class of 
proprietors. Now the activity of economic agents 
is determined by the goals set by a resource 
proprietor. On the one hand, any company is a 
plenipotentiary player in market interactions, 
and company managers are conditionally free 
to make decisions on resource distribution. On 
the other hand, managers act in the limits of 
the goals set by proprietors. The structure of a 
company ownership is not permanent in general. 
The change of an owner will, first of all, lead 
to changes in the goals set for managers. The 
orientation of a company on achieving new goals 
will lead to the correspondent changes in all 
company performance or in the performance of 
specific departments. The nature of these changes 
and their influence on a company performance 
more and more often interest future proprietors 
even before they purchase a company share. 
The research in the influence of property rights 
redistribution on company performance results 
should, in our opinion, take into consideration 
a quality assessment of the current in-company 
processes. Carrying out a full and thorough 
analysis of in-company situation before and after 
property rights redistribution can take much time 
while a continuous monitoring can require too 
much different company resources. As a rule, in 
order to economize resources, required for the 
analysis of the influence results, the assessment 
is only carried out in case of substantial changes 
in property rights structure, thus not allowing 
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to have a complete picture of the current in-
company situation. The method, based on the 
model considering the influence of property 
rights redistribution on an in-company economic 
efficiency can simplify a company performance 
assessment. Therefore, the research in property 
rights redistribution on a company performance 
can be considered topical. 
The Problem Statement 
According to the institutional approach, 
organizations are defined as institutes with people 
exploiting the potential of these institutes1. In this 
case any group of individuals will strive to achieve 
certain general goals and objectives, following the 
rules the institutes under consideration are based 
on. The property-based relations of economic 
entities are also regulated by certain institutes.
Institution theory of property rights consider 
a company to be a coalition of proprietors 
cooperating factors of production on the base 
of contracts structured in a complex way.2. 
A long-term contract aimed at proprietor-to-
proprietor relations concerning interspecific 
(interdependent) resources are in the heart 
of this coalition. Interspecific nature means 
interdependence, inter-unique nature of resources 
in relation to each other. If the coalition breaks 
up neither of the parties will be able to find an 
equivalent substitute for its current partner. Such 
a coalition ensures each partner a quazirenta, 
which can be shared with each other. Therefore, 
economic parties are interested in each other and 
in continuous cooperation. But, in the considered 
context it is worth focusing on a coalition of 
resource proprietors.
1 Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Eco-
nomic Theory: the Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics, translation from English ed. by V.S. Каtkalo, 
N.P. Дrozdova (St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. 
Petersburg State University, 2005), 10, in Russian.
2 R. I. Каpelushnikov, Economic Theory of Property Right 
(Methodology, Main Concepts, Current Issues). www.
libertarium.ru., in Russian.
A company exploits limited resources 
(welfare) having legal and physical characteristics. 
The institutional approach makes it possible to 
describe a company not as a solid and indivisible 
entity, producing some products and consuming 
some resources but as hierarchal structure where 
economic entities interact following certain rules 
of resources (limited welfare) distribution. Thus, 
we can consider the influence of a proprietor or 
a group of proprietors can have on a company 
performance, which, in its turn, can influence 
on company efficiency. The ratio of shares of 
different stockholders or participants determines 
the correlation of different levels of management 
and functional areas. In their turn, they depend 
on planning, organization, motivation and 
control over development and achievement of 
the set goals3. In other words, the property rights 
structure predetermines a company organizational 
and operational structure, thus determining a 
company efficiency4.
The possibility of strengthening the influence 
of a proprietor on a company operation and 
consequently, more strict control over a company 
performance and the set goals execution are the 
causes of the struggle between economic entities 
for the in-company influence via getting a larger 
share in a company property. A larger property 
share gives a proprietor a certain advantage. 
Large shareholders not only get the right to be 
in the know of current in-company situation5, 
but have more votes in making decisions on key 
problems of a company performance, including 
3 Michael H. Mescon, M. Albert, F. Khedouri, Manage-
ment (Мoscow: Delo, 2000), 38, 694, 689. ISBN 5-7749-
0126-2, translation from English, in Russian.
4 О.S. Sukharev, Institutional Economics and Economic 
Policy: about a New Theory of Transmission Mechanism 
in Macroeconomics (Мoscow: Ekonomika Publishing 
House, Russian Academy of Science, Institute of Eco-
nomics, 2007), 454, ISBN 978-5-282-02681-8, in Rus-
sian.
5 This enables them with promptly getting necessary 
information. This is specially important in case of the 
shareholder being insider and has no labor relation with 
a company under consideration. 
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top managers election. Thus, a proprietor holding 
a certain share in a company property irrespective 
of its legal and propriety status (cooperative, 
partnership) receives a right to participate in the 
process of in-company resource distribution and 
control over the distribution within the framework 
of the current rules. And the larger the share, the 
stronger influence can the proprietor have on a 
company performance results. 
The processes of transforming company 
resources into its welfare can be interpreted via 
two functions: transformation and transaction. 
Transformation function describes changes and 
reproduction of physical properties and total 
value of the resources, based on this function 
realization, makes the volume of transformation 
costs. Transaction function describes the changes 
in characteristics in the process of transactions 
related to propriety rights (changes in authority, 
property rights disposition and appropriation). 
The resources, their use stipulating the changes 
in legal status, make up a transaction component 
of overall production costs. In this case the 
change in institutional character take place and 
an economic agent will deal with transaction 
costs1.
As a company proprietor or proprietors set 
certain company goals, a qualitative assessment 
of these goals achievement defines the efficiency 
of a company performance. Traditional neoclassic 
efficiency analysis means assessing a company 
performance basing on the ratio of performance 
results to the costs to achieve these results. 
According to this approach the main goal of 
a company is receiving a maximum profit2, а 
1 А. Е. Shastitko, Institutional Economics: Theory 
and Methodology, Doctor of Economics dissertation 
(Мoscow, MSU, 1999),130.
2 Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and 
Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Insti-
tutional Economics , translation from English ed. by 
V.S. Каtkalo, N.P. Дrozdova (St. Petersburg: Publishing 
House of St. Petersburg State University, 2005, 404, in 
Russian.
company operation is described with a production 
function: 
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where Q is a volume of production; f is a function 
describing a production technology; K, L are 
volumes of expended resources per capital and 
labour accordingly.
To describe the mechanism of influence 
of change in property rights structure on the 
company performance efficiency it is necessary 
to create a model, considering the character and 
direction of both quantitive and qualitative in-
company changes. Institutional analysis makes it 
possible to assess the volume of transaction costs 
and thus, take into consideration the influence 
caused by the changes in property rights structure 
on its efficiency. 
The Model Description
To create a model of redistribution property 
rights influence on economic efficiency of 
a company performance it is, first of all, 
necessary to determine the efficiency function, 
taking into account not only technological 
company characteristics but also its institutional 
structure.
Let us consider a company property as an 
ownership of a certain company share or some 
company stocks or securities depending on a 
company legal and organizational status. Let us 
take an index of company efficiency changes 
before and after property rights redistribution as 
a criterion for the model quality assessment. 
It is important for us to build a model taking 
into consideration not only the profit as the 
main company goal, but also the costs, caused 
by the specific internal structure. It means 
that we should consider not only qualitative 
performance results but also the costs necessary 
to achieve these results. It is well known that the 
efficiency analysis is the assessment of the ratio 
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of expended resources to the received results 
both of the object on the whole and it’s certain 
parts (production processes, management, and 
technological processes). On the example of a 
certain company the efficiency analysis should 
be presented as the ration of a financial result 
to the costs required to achieve this results. 
Depending on the set goals and the object under 
analysis status it is possible to calculate the 
efficiency of certain parts or processes of the 
whole object. 
It is known that in general case, from 
neoclassical point of view efficiency can be 
presented in the following way:? ?LKfQ ,? ,
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where E is efficiency; π is profit; С is costs.
It is also known that profit expressed in 
money terms equals the difference between total 
revenue and total costs:
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where π is profit; TR is total return; TC is total 
costs.
Total return and total costs, in their turn, 
equal:
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where Q is production volume; P – price of 
goods (services) of the considered company. It 
depends on demand; r is value of a unit of capital 
as a resource; w is a value of a unit of labor as 
a resource; K, L are volumes of the expedient 
resources (in this case of capital and labor 
accordingly).
If we put known dependencies in the formula 
of profit definition, we get a traditional profit 
function:
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Note that in economic practice there is a 
concept of accounting profit which is essentially 
influenced by some external rules like tax 
regulations, accounting standards. This indicator 
is widely used for making decisions on potential 
actions concerning a company. Accounting profit 
indicators are considered to be used in a more 
correct way for calculating company performance 
efficiency. In this case the calculation of profit 
function is simplified and will depend on receiving 
necessary data from corporate reports.
The presented approach takes into 
consideration total company costs, presenting 
the volume of expenses on purchasing and 
transforming resources into welfare.
According to institutional theory, there are 
two types of total company costs: transaction 
and transformation. To take into consideration 
in-company structure, let us put institutional 
function into the model. It will show us the 
volume of transaction in-company costs in the 
process of making profit under certain volume of 
production. 
Тhus, institutional company efficiency can 
be presented as the ratio of profit to costs, resulting 
from the process of in-company economic subject 
interaction via institutional function:
? ?LKfQ ,? ,
C
E ?? ,
TCTR??? ,
PQ ??TR ,
wLrK ????TC ,
wLr?PQ ??????? .
,
If
wLr?PQ
If
Ei ??????? ?
?
?
?
q
j
jgIf
1
.
gqIf ?? .
1?
??
t
t
Ei
Ei
Ei .
nt
q
i
j
ntntntntntnt
t
q
j
j
tttttt
g
wLr?PQ
g
wLr?PQEi
??
??????
?
??
????????????
11
,
         
(7)
where If is company institutional function.
The institutional function shows the volume 
of in-company transaction costs, resulting from 
a company performance. Transaction cost in 
the main variable determining the level of in-
company costs. If we name the quantity of 
transactions as q, and the cost of j-transaction 
as g
j
, we get the following formula of company 
institutional function:
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If a known value of one transaction mean 
cost is g:
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There are different approaches to transaction 
costs classification and volume. P. Milgrom and 
G. Roberts differentiated transaction costs into 
two types: coordination costs and motivation 
costs. Coordination costs refer to expenditures 
on providing correspondence of all transaction 
participants in space and time. Motivation costs 
are the results of incomplete and imperfect 
information, opportunism of interaction 
participants. Expenditures on inspection, 
monitoring, and collecting information on the 
partners’ following mutual duties fixed in the 
contract can refer to motivation costs1. It is hard 
to estimate costs in a particular deal under the 
Milgrom and Roberts approach.
A more adaptive variant of transaction 
costs calculation for a deal is offered North and 
Eggerson classification2. All transaction costs are 
classified into six categories: information search 
costs, negotiation costs, costs on concluding a 
contract, monitoring costs, costs on contract 
enforcement, costs on protection from the third 
party. 
We consider the North and Wallas method 
adapted to transaction costs estimate in case of a 
particular company as the most adequate for real 
estimation of transaction costs volume3.
North and Wallas consider labor cost, 
capitals cost, land cost and cost of entrepreneur 
abilities expended on transaction as transaction 
1 Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, Economics, Organization 
and Management (St. Petersburg: Economicheskaya 
shkola, 1999), in Russian.
2 T. Eggerson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Mos-
cow: Delо, 2001), in Russian.
3 Ya. I. Кuzminov, Course in Institutional Economics: 
Institutes, Networks, Transaction Costs, Contracts 
(Мoscow: Publishing House of State Institution of High-
er School of Economics, 2006). 256, in Russian
costs. All transaction costs are divided into three 
categories:
1 category – seller-buyer costs.
2 category – in-company costs, arising from 
relations with intermediaries.
3 category – costs, arising from propriety 
rights protection.
The first category includes costs on both 
sides. «Buyer transaction costs are the ones on 
purchasing goods and services (time spent on 
goods inspection, searching information on 
prices, the seller, alternative variants, etc.). They 
do not influence the seller profit. Seller transaction 
costs are the ones продавца which he would have 
in case his buying the goods or services himself, 
say, advertising costs»4. 
The second category includes the salary 
of those employees whose are involved in the 
activity leading to transaction costs, as well as the 
cost of the capital they use. These employees can 
deal with resource purchase, product distribution, 
coordination and monitoring of in-company 
transformation function. 
Transaction costs of the third category 
comprise costs on police and judicial system 
keeping and pay, on national defense, etc.
To apply the method on a company level 
one should make changes in transaction costs 
categorizing. Thus, we consider company 
external costs on property transfer instead of 
buyer-seller relation costs; replace in-company 
costs arising from relations with intermediaries 
by internal costs on property rights transfer; and 
the costs arising from propriety rights protection 
are transformed into internal and external costs 
on propriety rights protection.
The first costs type will include the costs 
arising in the process of goods or services 
purchase (time spent on goods inspection, 
searching information on prices, the seller, 
4 Ibid., 256.
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alternative variants, etc.). They do not influence 
the seller profit. 
The second costs type will include the 
salary of those employees whose are involved in 
the activity leading to transaction costs. These 
employees deal with in-company contract quality 
and term control and facilitate the main production 
performance. They also provide interaction of the 
main company departments. 
Transaction costs of the third type are those 
arising from propriety rights protection. These 
costs comprise costs on keeping and salary 
of company departments and the employees 
responsible for providing propriety rights 
protection on the company as the whole and 
the company resources in particular, including 
intellectual property.
As a resulting assessment criterion of property 
rights redistribution influence on efficiency, let 
us introduce an index of institutional efficiency 
change – ∆Ei. Let us mark the moment in time 
corresponding to the period after property rights 
redistribution as t, and the period before property 
rights redistribution аs t-1. Then:
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And in general case:
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Consequently, the influence of property 
rights redistribution on company performance 
can be determined via the derived index of 
institutional efficiency change.
Conclusion 
Accelerated and more complicated in-
company interaction, company size growth 
and a more complex structure can lead to the 
insufficiency of the traditionally used indices. 
Managers need tools for quality change assessment, 
with quantity indices taking into consideration 
the peculiarities of in-company structure. The 
presented model provides a researcher with an 
instrument to measure the influence of propriety 
rights redistribution on company performance 
through several values of the resulting criterion 
of institutional efficiency. The information of the 
kind can be interesting to company proprietors and 
managers making decisions on the issues under 
consideration. Both top management and company 
proprietors need prompt and precise information 
on in-company exchange situation.
The institutional efficiency model can 
provide the opportunity to assess the degree 
and direction of property rights redistribution 
influence on company performance efficiency. 
Profit indices application and availability of 
assessment method for in-company transaction 
costs can simplify and easify the procedure of 
collecting initial data necessary for company 
performance analysis. This method can be used 
for continuous monitoring of company efficiency 
changes taking into account in-company 
structure peculiarities, not considered in former 
methods of company efficiency assessment. As 
for calculation of intermediary indices, they can 
provide researchers with additional information 
on the situation with in-company property rights 
exchange.
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Влияние перераспределения прав собственности  
на экономическую эффективность фирмы
И.С. Пыжев, И.А. Изаков
Сибирский федеральный университет 
Россия 660041, г. Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79 
В статье исследован механизм влияния изменения структуры прав собственности на 
эффективность деятельности фирмы. Сформирована модель, учитывающая влияние, 
вызванное изменением структуры прав собственности на эффективность. В рамках модели 
предложено понятие институциональной эффективности фирмы, отражающее отношение 
прибыли к издержкам, возникающим в процессе взаимодействия экономических субъектов 
внутри фирмы через институциональную функцию. В качестве критерия оценки влияния 
перераспределения прав собственности на эффективность введен показатель изменения 
институциональной эффективности.
Igor S. Pyzhev, Ivan A. Izakov. Influence of Property Right Redistribution on Company Economic Efficiency
Ключевые слова: фирма, экономическая эффективность, перераспределение прав 
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